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"Oft Expectation Fails"  
A Time-Series Analysis of Construction Starts in the London Office Market  
 
Abstract 
Expectations of future market conditions are generally acknowledged to be crucial for the development decision and hence for 
shaping the built environment. This empirical study of the Central London office market from 1987 to 2009 tests for 
evidence of adaptive and naive expectations. Applying VAR models and a recursive OLS regression with one-step forecasts, 
we find evidence of adaptive and naïve, rather than rational expectations of developers. Although the magnitude of the errors 
and the length of time lags vary over time and development cycles, the results confirm that developers’ decisions are explained 
to a large extent by contemporaneous and past conditions in both London submarkets. The corollary of this finding is that 
developers may be able to generate excess profits by exploiting market inefficiencies but this may be hindered in practice by the 
long periods necessary for planning and construction of the asset. More generally, the results of this study suggest that real 
estate cycles are largely generated endogenously rather than being the result of unexpected exogenous shocks.  
 
Introduction 
The way in which developers form their expectations of development values, costs, and hence 
profitability, plays a crucial role in influencing their decisions to develop (Henneberry and Rowley, 2000). 
Much of the research done on development cycles and on developers‟ expectations supports the assertion 
that present and past trends remain the dominant influence on the formulation of developers‟ profit 
expectations rather than rational expectations.  
This paper tests empirically whether developers active in London City and London West End between 
1986 and 2009 have responded to current or past trends, or whether evidence of rational expectations can 
be found in their decision making. The main hypothesis to be tested is that developers predominantly 
respond to past trends when forming their profit expectations and hence exhibit adaptive rather than 
rational expectations. This paper also seeks to uncover whether different patterns of developer behaviour 
can be identified between the market cycles that occurred during the period under review and whether 
developers have behaved differently in the two submarkets. The paper also aims to investigate whether 
there is a „memory effect‟ among developers, which would mean that following a severe downturn in the 
City and the West End office markets development activity would stay below the levels suggested by 
current market conditions for a number of years, in essence confirming the assumption of adaptive 
expectations.  
This paper is structured as follows. After a discussion of the extant literature on expectations in the real 
estate literature, we describe the analytical strategy used to detect whether developers exhibit adaptive or 
  
rational expectations.  Next, the results of the empirical analysis of the London office market are 
presented and interpreted. Finally, the wider implications of these findings are explored with a view 
towards developing an agenda for future research.  
 
Previous studies  
The cyclicality of both property markets and construction activity is one of the best researched 
phenomena in the real estate literature. Most empirical studies use an equilibrium framework to analyse 
and predict cycles. The underlying assumption is typically that a deviation from equilibrium prices as for 
example reflected in prices above replacement value will trigger a development response (see Hendershott 
et al, 1999 and Hendershott et al ,2002) albeit with a time lag.  
 
The scope of this paper is more narrowly defined in that it focuses on developers‟ expectations and their 
impact on construction activity. To this end, we test for the presence of three types of expectations. 
Under rational expectations, developers are said to use the best currently available information to form their 
expectations where the best information may involve forecasts that need to take into account the likely 
actions of their competitors given the current market consensus. Naive expectations (also called myopic 
expectations) imply that developers expect that future market prices equal current market prices adjusted 
for expected inflation and thus assume current real prices and rents for future cash flows in their 
development appraisals. Finally, adaptive expectations future expectations are a simple extrapolation of past 
values. Both naive and adaptive expectations can lead to overbuilding and, in turn, to lower capital values 
and rents but adaptive expectations in particular may also lead to supply below the equilibrium level as 
developers tend to be overly pessimistic and cautious in their outlook following a downturn.  
 
 
Rational expectations  
The rational expectations theory was originally developed by John F. Muth in response to perceived flaws 
in theories based on adaptive expectations. Muth (1961) argued that averages of expectations are a more 
accurate indicator of expected future values than naive or adaptive models such as the cobweb model. 
According to the rational expectations theory, optimal forecasts about the future are made using all 
available information. As a result of rational expectations, changes in real estate asset prices over time 
should be unpredictable and thus follow a „random walk‟ (Malpezzi and Wachter, 2005). Rational 
expectations play a central role in the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), developed by Eugene Fama in 
the mid-1960s. According to this hypothesis, if market participants compete for information then current 
asset prices will rapidly adjust (through trading) and leave no room for arbitrage and excess profits on the 
basis of the information. In essence, an efficient market is one where all market prices fully and 
  
instantaneously reflect all relevant information and rational expectations act to ensure that any new 
relevant information is quickly embedded into current prices.     
According to Gatzlaff and Tırtıroğlu (1995:161), “in real estate markets, information efficiency implies 
that the distribution of market prices accurately reflects the spectrum of characteristics and risks 
associated with each asset”. In other words, any errors associated with pricing real estate assets are 
random which makes it impossible for developers to earn excess profits based on past trends and hence 
there is little incentive for speculation (Malpezzi and Wachter, 2005). Therefore, in an efficient real estate 
market where developers exercise rational expectations, real estate cycles cannot normally be generated 
endogenously but are rather the result of exogenous shocks (Wheaton, 1999). However, there is a 
considerable amount of evidence to suggest that real estate markets are inefficient. Indeed, much of the 
literature supports the argument that real estate developers form their expectations based on current and 
past trends with the result that real estate prices do not form a „random walk‟. If the „random walk‟ 
proposition does not hold, it is arguably possible to predict future pricing based on past trends and excess 
profits could be earned by developers who know this is how other developers form their expectations 
(Malpezzi and Wachter, 2005).  
 
Naive and adaptive expectations 
In his study of the City of London office market over the period 1970 to 2004, Barras (2005) identified a 
link between change in rents and the rate of building starts. Effectively, the higher the rate of rental 
growth, the higher the profitability of new developments, and thus the higher the rate of new 
construction starts. Barras also found that the addition of development cost variables and real interest 
rates into his development supply equation caused no significant improvement. His findings confirm his 
earlier study which showed that a change in capital values is transmitted into variations in development 
profitability, which in turn determine the level of development starts. In essence, a direct response to 
contemporary values by developers is suggested (Barras, 1983).  
Typically, in adaptive expectations some element of error transfer could also be expected from the 
previous year‟s forecast to the subsequent forecast. McGough and Tsolacos, (1999) argue that developers 
revise their forecasts in the light of the error made in forecasting the most recent observation. 
Wheaton et al (1997) reached similar conclusions in their study of the Greater London office market over 
the period 1970 to 1995. They found that the building boom of the 1980s appeared to be a reaction to 
strong occupier demand and increasing real rental growth during the period, confirming the assumption 
that developers respond to current market signals. The results reinforced Wheaton‟s earlier findings that 
the current state of the economy influences the formation of developers‟ expectations. By studying how 
closely real estate cycles are interlinked with the national economy, Wheaton (1987) found that both 
  
demand and supply seem to respond directly to current macroeconomic changes, with current growth in 
office employment having a particularly significant impact on the supply side. 
Key et al (1994) confirm these results in their study of development activity in the United Kingdom. 
Using regression analysis the authors tested how well current prices, past market values of one or two 
years ago, building costs and financing costs explain changes in the volume of construction orders in the 
office sector since 1968. The results confirmed that current and past prices show a positive impact on 
building whilst rising construction costs are found to depress new development. Similarly, high interest 
rates were found to dampen new construction, although their influence was not found to be statistically 
significant. Although the authors acknowledge the impact financial liberalisation had on development 
activity in the 1980s, they conclude that no more than a production lag and a blind response to current 
price changes are needed to construct a model of highly erratic cycles.  
In line with the other arguments outlined in this paper, Antwi and Henneberry (1995) have highlighted 
how developers‟ reactions to the market environment may differ from those prescribed by the rational 
expectations theory and EMH.  The authors argue that developers may display a non-linear response to 
property market signals.  Computer-based behavioural modelling is applied to imitate alternative strategies 
that developers might adopt to formulate profit expectations and, hence, to make development decisions.  
Their paper focuses on the analysis of three different decision-making strategies. Firstly, current price-
taking, which the authors acknowledge remains the traditional approach adopted by developers; secondly, 
formal forecasting for which Antwi and Henneberry find little evidence of widespread adoption; and 
thirdly, habit-persistence, a strategy found to be common in markets exhibiting strong growth. The 
authors find that not all developers are current-price takers but rather adopt a number of different 
strategies to formulate the expectations upon which their decision to build are based on. During periods 
of extreme market change habit-persistence strategies are more likely to be incorporated into 
development appraisals leading to inflated profit expectations and subsequently increasing the amplitude 
of the development cycle. 
Henneberry and Rowley (2000) also found that in determining development profitability, the method 
whereby costs and values current at the time of the appraisal remains the dominant approach in residual 
valuations.  The authors emphasise that development values, which vary more than developments costs 
over time and between locations, are the main influence on development profitability. However, they also 
acknowledge Antwi and Henneberry‟s (1995) argument that trend extrapolation becomes more 
widespread in markets exhibiting strong growth and is more likely to be adopted by less experienced 
developers.  Thus, they find that estimates of development profitability produced by residual valuations 
and based on cost and values at the time of the appraisal can depart significantly from profits actually 
achieved, especially around cyclical turning points. This difference is magnified when trend extrapolation 
is incorporated into the valuation. The authors point out that it is precisely because developers‟ behaviour 
  
is influenced by these decision-making techniques which misrepresent profit opportunities that so many 
companies are bankrupted in property market down-turns.  
 
Fuerst and McAllister (2010) studied the relationship between supply and demand in 18 European office 
markets during the period of 1996 to 2006 in order to test whether new supply is a function of current or 
lagged demand. The authors‟ aim was to establish whether developers respond to current market signals 
when making investment decisions or whether they try to anticipate future market conditions in their 
decision making process which would indicate rational expectations. The authors confirm Antwi and 
Henneberry's (1995) proposition that while there is some evidence of myopic behaviour evident in a 
proportion of the markets examined scant evidence was found to support the argument that developers 
systematically display myopic expectations. By studying supply elasticities in these markets using data on 
rental growth, take-up and completions they found considerable diversity in developer responses to 
demand signals. The authors also propose the hypothesis that myopic behaviour may be fuelled by 
competition between developers, whereby unrealistically high prices are adopted in development 
appraisals to justify higher site costs.   
Adopting an option pricing approach, Grenadier (1995, 1996) seeks to explain developers‟ expectations 
using assumptions of rationality. He argues that although the risk of overbuilding is higher when 
construction times are longer, developers will continue to develop in the knowledge of this risk because 
the benefits of good outcomes are believed to outweigh the costs of poor outcomes. Moreover, when 
developers see the market beginning to turn negative, they realise that if it erodes any further and if any of 
their competitors begin to build, they will be shut out of the market. Before this comes to fruition, each 
developer builds simultaneously in an attempt to avoid pre-emption.  Grenadier justifies this reaction by 
arguing that whilst building in a downturn is harmful to developers, it is less harmful that the alternative 
of becoming a follower in a down market. Whilst his argument tries to provide some rational for 
developers‟ decisions to build in a downturn, the developers in his model are essentially “panicked” into 
building by the market conditions current at the time, which implies myopic rather than rational 
expectations. 
 
Grenadier‟s arguments can also be seen to have some elements of disaster myopia and herd behaviour 
that reinforce the concept of myopic expectations. Herring and Wachter (1999) argue that developers 
demonstrate a particular form of adaptive expectations and myopic pricing behaviour, „disaster myopia‟, 
due to the low-frequency and non-observation of negative events, which leads them to underestimate the 
possibility of market downturns.  
 
It can also be argued that as the projection of future market conditions is so difficult, developers may 
merely opt to “go with the herd” in their decisions as the safest option. In essence there is a tendency for 
  
developers to respond collectively to the same signals which can be interpreted as an example of herd 
behaviour (Fuerst and McAllister, 2010).  
 
Notwithstanding these arguments, developers are not completely autonomous in their decisions and 
instead depend crucially on an adequate supply of development finance (Antwi and Henneberry, 1995). 
Lenders, similar to developers, have been found to exhibit adaptive expectations in their decisions and 
tend to be too optimistic in market upturns and too pessimistic in downturns and thus exacerbating the 
boom and bust cycle (Ball et al, 1998). Table 1 provides a summary overview of the key theories discussed 
in this literature review.  
 
   
  
Table 1 
Theory  Rational expectations  Naive expectations  Adaptive expectations  
Key argument  The best currently available information is used to form future expectations. 
Expectations are assumed not to be systematically biased and hence any errors 
associated with pricing are random. As a result of rational expectations, changes 
in asset prices over time should be unpredictable and follow  a „random walk‟. 
Future prices  = Current prices + expected inflation  Future prices = f(past values) adjusted for past errors.  
Authors quoted  Muth (1961);  
  
Gatzlaff and Tırtıroğlu (1995)  
Barras (2005 and 1983);  
  
Wheaton et al (1997);  
  
Key et al (1994) By studying the changes in the volume 
of construction orders in the UK office sector since 
1968 Key et at (1994) found that current  and past prices 
of one or two years ago show a positive impact on 
building.  evidence of both naive and adaptive 
expectations.  
Antwi and Henneberry (1995) current price taking (naive 
expectations) remains the traditional approach adopted by 
developers, during periods of strong growth, adaptive 
expectations are more likely to be incorporated into 
development appraisals. 
Henneberry and Rowley (2000) adoption of current prices in 
development appraisals remains the dominant approach but 
adaptive expectations more common in markets exhibiting 
strong growth and are more likely to be adopted by less 
experienced developers.   
Fuerst and McAllister (2010) no systematic evidence of 
myopic expectations. idiosyncratic rather than systematic 
factors more important for supply-side responses to market 
signals. Myopic behaviour may be fuelled by competition 
between developers. 
 
  
Exploratory data analysis  
The empirical analysis of this paper draws on a database containing the volume of new starts, prime 
headline rents, take-up and availability ratios for both London submarkets from 1987 to 2009 provided by 
DTZ. Additionally, data on service employment was obtained from Oxford Economics.  
Before proceeding to formal econometric testing, an exploratory analysis of the data appears in order. In 
particular, graphing of time series variables may help to identify initial evidence of a „memory effect‟ in 
development activity in the City and West End office markets over the last two decades. A memory effect 
would entail that development activity stays below the levels suggested by current market conditions for a 
number of years, in essence confirming the assumption of adaptive expectations. Figures 1 and 2 show 
the annual change in new starts, prime headline rents and take-up in London City and London West End 
over the study period.     
Figure 1: City 
 
In both markets, the first significant downturn over the period under review was experienced following 
the building boom in the late 1980s. As shown above, no clear indication of a „memory effect‟ can be seen 
in the garphs following this downturn. While the timing of the recovery differs in both submarkets,  new 
starts appear to recover in line with rents. The second significant downturn in both markets was seen 
around 2000-2002. Again, no evidence of a subsequent memory effect is evident. Instead, developers 
appear to have responded rapidly to improved market conditions. Another pronounced market downturn 
occurred in 2008-9 but the available time series does not yet allow a study of the recovery pattern. 
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Although the historical data analysis does not indicate the presence of a „memory effect‟ among 
developers, it suggests that developers exercise adaptive expectations as a lagged relationship of one to 
three years is identified between changes in demand (proxied by take-up and prime headline rents) and 
changes in new starts in both the City and West End markets.  
Figure 2: West End 
 
 
Econometric analysis 
Two parallel approaches are used to test the hypothesis that developers predominantly respond to past 
trends when forming their profit expectations:  a Vector Auto-Regressive (VAR) model with subsequent 
Granger causality modelling and a recursive ordinary least square (OLS) model with one-step forecasts. 
VAR model and Granger causality 
Following a stationarity test on all the variables in London City, it was found that the level of new starts is 
stationary while the rest of the variables are non-stationary. As cointegration can only be tested when all 
the endogenous variables are non-stationary, it was concluded that it would not be possible to test for a 
cointegrating relationship in London City.  As a result, a VAR model to test for Granger causality was 
chosen. First differences were taken for the variables that were found to be non-stationary (prime 
headline rents, take-up and availability ratio) in order to achieve stationarity.  For the sake of consistency, 
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a VAR model was applied to the London West End time series data although these were found to be 
non-stationary.  
To test for Granger causality, three VAR models were estimated using one year and two year lags, taking 
care to include only stationary series. Each of the VAR models includes the new start variable and one of 
the other three variables (prime headline rents, take-up or availability ratio). The models also include a 
dummy variable to capture the different phases of the property cycles in London City and London West 
End:  
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Where tx  represents the new start variable and ty  represents one of the other variables. 
tt DumandDum )2()1(  are included in order to capture the upturns and downturns of the property 
cycles respectively. To establish whether changes in the explanatory variables induces (thus Granger 
causes) developers to build during property cycle upturns the following hypothesis tests were carried out: 
Null hypothesis: 0654    
Alternative hypothesis: 0654    
In London City, the following property cycle upturns were identified by the presence of positive rental 
growth: 1986 to 1989, 1994 to 2001, 2004 to 2007. The following downturns were identified by the 
presence of negative rental growth: 1990 to 1993, 2002 to 2003 and 2008 to 2009. In London West End, 
the corresponding periods were 1986 to 1989, 1994 to 2000, 2004 to 2007 and 1990 to 1993, 2001 to 
2003 and 2008 to 2009 respectively.  
 
Recursive OLS model 
The stationarity test carried out on the variables to be included - Output of Service Industries (OSER) 
and real rents - established that OSER is a non-stationary variable while real rents is a stationary variable.  
For this reason, real rents in the model have been assessed in levels whilst changes in OSER have been 
observed. The model incorporates a two year lag. The recursive OLS model was run over the whole 
period of 1986 to 2009 as it was decided that the data period under study was too short to be broken up 
into cycles.  
  
Tables 2 and 3 show the recursive OLS model that has been applied, with new starts as the endogenous 
variable and real rents and changes in OSER as the explanatory variables. The first test on the model 
calculates a correlation coefficient between the recursive forecast errors and the explanatory variables. If 
forecast errors are found to be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, it would indicate that at the 
time of decision making all available information is used, such that developers do not appear to be 
making systematic errors.  
The second test on the model aims to establish whether the forecast errors themselves are correlated 
across time (serial correlation). The absence of serial correlation would indicate that past forecast errors 
are included in the information set used by developers in order to inform their decision making. The test 
is carried out by using the Ljung- Box Q- test to assess whether the ex post forecast errors are correlated 
across time.    
 
Table  2           
  CITY  
  Variable   Coefficient   t-statistic 
            
  Constant   -5.637   -4.370 
  ∆log(OSER)   17.891   3.155 
  LOG(RCRENT)   1.583   4.418 
            
  R-square 0.63       
  F-stat (2,20) 18.59       
  DW-statistic 1.99       
  RESET test 0.43       
Table 3           
  WEST END  
  Variable   Coefficient t-statistic 
            
  Constant   -4.666   -2.540 
  ∆log(OSER)   24.932   3.718 
  LOG(RWRENT)   1.209   2.561 
            
  R-square 0.57       
  F-stat (2,20) 9.35       
  DW-statistic 1.68       
  RESET test 0.22       
 
Results of expectation tests  
  
The results of the Granger causality test with the VAR model (Tables 4 and 5) suggest that developers 
adopt adaptive expectations in both markets. In London City, the number of starts has been influenced 
by the change in prime headline rents and particularly by the change in take-up over the previous two 
years. In London West End, the change in prime headline rents has had less of an impact on the change 
in the number of new starts, with the change in the previous two years‟ take-up showing a significant 
effect on developers‟ expectations. Although, the cyclical swings in prime headline rents have been more 
pronounced in the West End than in the City, West End rents have consistently remained above those in 
the City due to the restrictive size of the development market in the West End, which means that there is 
a smaller chance of over-supply of new space in comparison to the City. Moreover, during the study 
period, prime headline rents in the West End never fell below the level where it would become 
uneconomical to develop based purely on rents. Arguably, these reasons help to explain why a change in 
prime headline rents has had less of an impact on new starts in the West End than in the City. In both 
submarkets, a change in the level of the availability ratio has had the least impact on new starts of all the 
explanatory variables. However, this could be due to the fact that the availability ratio used in the model 
refers to total availability in the market, rather than to availability of newly built premises or 
refurbishments.  
Somewhat in contrast to the observations of Antwi and Henneberry (1995) and Henneberry and Rowley 
(2000) that adaptive expectations are more likely to be occur during periods of strong growth the results 
of the VAR model demonstrate that past explanatory variables are found to be similarly significant in 
both downturns and upturns.  
Overall, the results suggest that developers‟ decisions are systematically biased to past trends, meaning 
that real estate prices do not form a „random walk‟. Arguably, it is therefore possible to predict future 
pricing based on past trends and excess profits could be earned by developers who know this is how 
other developers form their expectations (Malpezzi and Wachter, 2005). Hence, based on the results from 
the Granger causality test with the VAR model we reject the hypothesis that developers exercise rational 
expectations in the London office market.     
Results from the Granger causality test with the VAR model 
 
Table 4: London City 
 
Hypothesis: Change in prime headline rents Granger causes the number of new starts 
Test period  t-statistic p-values 
1986-1989  20.94  0.0001 
1990-1993  5.92  0.12 
1994-2001  5.85  0.12 
2002-2003  10.15  0.02 
2004-2007  6.20  0.10 
2008-2009  7.86  0.05 
Hypothesis: Change in the level of take-up Granger causes the number of new starts 
Test period  t-statistic p-values 
1986-1989  30.00  0.000 
  
1990-1993  20.00  0.0002 
1994-2001  9.12  0.03 
2002-2003  12.37  0.01 
2004-2007  10.99  0.01 
2008-2009  13.50  0.004 
Hypothesis: Change in the level of the availability ratio Granger causes the number of new starts 
Test period  t-statistic p-values 
1986-1989  24.99  0.0000 
1990-1993  7.47  0.06 
1994-2001  3.21  0.36 
2002-2003  5.05  0.17 
2004-2007  2.98  0.40 
2008-2009  3.12  0.37 
 
Table 5: London West End 
 
Hypothesis: Change in prime headline rents Granger causes a change in the number of new starts 
Test period  t-statistic p-values 
1986-1989  2.94  0.40 
1990-1993  3.42  0.33 
1994-2000  16.53  0.0009 
2001-2003  10.79  0.01 
2004-2007  6.00  0.11 
2008-2009  5.85  0.12 
Hypothesis: Change in take-up level Granger causes a change in the number of new starts 
Test period  t-statistic p-values 
1986-1989  13.24  0.004 
1990-1993  11.81  0.008 
1994-2000  16.07  0.001 
2001-2003  13.02  0.004 
2004-2007  13.55  0.003 
2008-2009  13.71  0.003 
Hypothesis: Change in availability ratio Granger causes a change in the number of new starts 
Test period  t-statistic p-values 
1986-1989  5.26  0.15 
1990-1993  4.20  0.24 
1994-2000  5.53  0.14 
2001-2003  3.57  0.31 
2004-2007  8.64  0.03 
2008-2009  8.78  0.03 
 
The results from the first test City presented in Table 6 demonstrate that past forecast error terms are not 
correlated with the past values of the forecast explanatory variables (changes in OSER and real rents). 
This indicates that developers are not making systematic errors in using the information they have 
available to inform their decisions regarding whether to build. The results from the second test (Table 6) 
suggest that forecast errors are not correlated with the forecast errors from the previous time periods. 
This implies that developers are taking into account their past forecast errors while examining new 
information which is used to formulate new forecasts of future market conditions.   
 
 
 
  
Table 6 
City           
    ∆OSER RCRENT     
 Test 1 error -0.097 0.0787     
 Test 2 LB Q-statistic (2lags) 2.3666 (0.306) 
West End         
    ∆OSER RWRENT     
 Test 1 error -0.167 0.082     
 Test 2 LB Q-statistic (2lags) 2.2717   (0.321)     
 
Finally, the residuals from the recursive OLS model were used to estimate an Auto-regressive model with 
one lag, AR(1), with the following specification:  
 
The estimated coefficients from the model were found to be -0.03 in the City and -0.003 in the West End. 
Both had a probability value of greater than 0.80 and were therefore found to be statistically insignificant.  
The test for serial correlation and the subsequent regression using the residuals from the previous model 
suggest that the residuals are not serially correlated. In essence, these results would imply that developers 
exercise rational expectations in the sense that previous forecast errors are not systematically carried over 
to subsequent forecasts. However, these findings could be due to small sample size; different results 
might be obtained if the period under study were longer. Having plotted the residuals from the model, 
Figure 3 suggests a potential relationship between the error terms. In essence, although the error is not 
partially carried over as is typically the case in adaptive expectations, the charts appear to suggest that 
developers revise their expectations (either from positive to negative, or vice versa) based on the previous 
year‟s forecast error. As a result, it could be argued that developers are demonstrating adaptive 
expectations as they are learning from their past mistakes. This would imply that the forecasts that are 
produced are systematically biased to past information, which in turn indicates that any errors associated 
with pricing real estate assets in development appraisals are not random and hence the assumption of 
rational expectations is rejected. 
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Figure 3: Residuals from the recursive OLS model – City (left) and West End (right) 
 
 
Conclusions 
This paper set out to expand and update empirically the substantial body of literature on real estate cycles 
by conducting an empirical analysis of the Central London office market incorporating data from the 
severe market downturn in 2008-9. More specifically, it tested whether the market-level data exhibit 
evidence of adaptive and naive expectations. The empirical evidence covering the period 1987 to 2009 
suggests that developers exercise adaptive and naïve, rather than rational expectations when making the 
decision to build. Although the results from the Granger causality test based on the VAR model indicate 
that the strength of factors driving the development decision vary over time and development cycles, we 
find evidence that developers‟ decisions have mainly been based on backward-looking decision criteria in 
both London submarkets.  
The corollary of this finding is that developers may be able to generate excess profits by exploiting market 
inefficiencies but this may be hindered in practice by the long periods necessary for planning and 
construction of the asset which prevents an effective timing strategy in the marketplace. Hence, it is 
possible to argue that real estate cycles are largely generated endogenously rather than being the result of 
exogenous shocks.  
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